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THE POLITICS OF ACCESS:  EXAMINING 
CONCERTED STATE/PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
SOLUTIONS TO CLASS ACTION BANS 
Myriam Gilles* 
 
Procedural and substantive constraints on the ability of ordinary people 
to access the civil justice system have become all too commonplace.  The 
“justice gap” owes much to cuts in funding for legal aid and court 
administration, heightened pleading standards, ever-rising costs of 
discovery, increasingly restrictive views on standing to sue, and the co-opting 
of small claims court by businesses seeking to collect debts, among other 
obstacles in the path to the courthouse.  But the most consequential 
impediment, surely, is the enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses with 
class action bans, which bar consumers and employees from bringing or 
being represented in any form of collective litigation.  This Article, written 
for a colloquium dedicated to the persistent problems of representation and 
access, explores the politics of regaining citizens’ rights to aggregate 
litigation in the wake of the Supreme Court’s broad endorsement of these 
class-ban provisions in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. 
Given the political climate in Washington, D.C., it is a safe bet that federal 
legislation will not overrule Concepcion anytime soon.  Meanwhile, state 
legislation constraining class-banning arbitration clauses faces the 
unremitting threat of FAA preemption.  But scholars and access-to-justice 
advocates have begun to focus on a third avenue for overcoming claims—
suppressing class action bans, referred to in this Article as “concerted 
state/private enforcement solutions.”  Concerted state/private enforcement 
can take several forms—whether it’s state Attorneys General engaging 
private counsel to pursue parens patriae damages cases under the AG’s 
direction, utilizing a qui tam model, or creating a regime where government 
enforcers obtain liability verdicts that private parties can use as conclusive 
proof in individual arbitrations.  Each holds its own promises and poses its 
own challenges.  But unlike head-on state legislation, the concerted 
state/private options are all viable as a legal matter.  The question of political 
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viability, however, is more nuanced.  This Article explores the unique 
political calculus for states confronting the implications of the various forms 
of state/private concerted enforcement activity as a way to restore their 
citizens’ access to justice in the post-Concepcion era. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nearly every state in the country authorizes consumers to bring claims for 
injuries caused by unfair and deceptive practices pursuant to statutory private 
causes of action.  The vast majority of states also statutorily protect 
employees from workplace violations by authorizing private enforcement of 
labor codes.  Many of these state consumer and labor statutes expressly 
anticipate class and collective litigation as a principal means of private 
enforcement.1  This is because conventional wisdom teaches that consumer 
fraud and workplace abuse typically injure large groups of victims in 
relatively small, nearly identical ways.  Few of those victims, if any, would 
take on the cost and complexity of the legal system alone to recoup such small 
sums.  Only by aggregating their claims and pooling resources can ordinary 
litigants realistically access the legal system. 
But what happens to this access if class or collective actions are no longer 
available as a matter of federal statutory law?  In the absence of procedural 
devices to efficiently and reliably aggregate numerous small claims, how can 
citizens remedy widespread violations of labor, consumer, employee 
benefits, debt collection, and antitrust laws?  And how do they protect 
themselves against future rights-infringing conduct without the threat of such 
liability? 
These questions are not theoretical.  Today, millions of consumers and 
employees are subject to unilaterally imposed arbitration provisions 
containing class action bans.2  These provisions prohibit aggregation of legal 
claims in public courts and demand that all disputes be resolved in one-on-
 
 1. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 28-3905(k)(1)(B) (2018); FLA. STAT. § 501.201 (2017); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 48-608(1) (West 2017); IND. CODE § 24-5-0.5-4(b) (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 50-634(c)–(d) (West 2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9(2) (2017); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW 
§§ 342-b, 349 (McKinney 2017). 
 2. Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Arbitration Epidemic, ECON. 
POL’Y INST. (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration-epidemic/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZL3U-FYKC]. 
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one, private arbitrations.  The practical reality is that no rational consumer or 
employee with a typical small- to mid- value grievance would undertake a 
costly individual arbitration—nor could she hope to find a lawyer willing to 
represent her on a contingency basis.3  As a result, class action bans 
essentially immunize putative defendants against aggregate liability for 
wrongful activity.  Unsurprisingly, these provisions have become standard 
practice in standard-form consumer contracts.4  Equally disturbing, class 
action bans have bled into employment contracts, barring workers from 
bringing claims in court for widespread acts of discrimination, wage theft, 
unsafe conditions, and other workplace injuries.5 
Federal legislative and administrative efforts to stave off the deleterious 
effects of these contractual provisions have largely failed.  The proposed 
Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA), which would broadly invalidate predispute 
arbitration clauses imposed on consumers and employees, has been 
repeatedly introduced by congressional Democrats since 2005.  But the AFA 
has never once made it out of committee and is surely no closer to enactment 
in today’s political environment.6  Less ambitious legislation—disallowing 
mandatory arbitration clauses in certain instances or as against certain 
narrowly drawn claimants—has occasionally passed, but these piecemeal 
efforts do not come close to addressing the broader problem.7  Most 
distressing, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s long-awaited rule 
prohibiting forced arbitration and class action bans in consumer financial 
contracts was repealed by the Senate along party lines, with the Vice 
President casting the tie-breaking vote.8 
 
 3. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY § 1, at 11 (2015), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/SV5Y-SJW2] (noting that, from 2010 to 2012, consumers filed an 
average of 411 individual arbitrations per year to resolve disputes—a staggeringly low number 
given the nearly ten million consumers represented in comparable class actions during the 
same period). 
 4. Id. § 2, at 22, 26 (reporting that over 87 percent of mobile wireless contracts and 99 
percent of storefront payday loans are subject to forced arbitration). 
 5. See, e.g., Kriston Capps, Sorry:  You Still Can’t Sue Your Employer, CITYLAB (July 
11, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/07/the-fine-print-that-keeps-you-from-suing 
-your-employer/533145/ [https://perma.cc/JB4P-DZ6Q] (reporting that Wells Fargo, 
Citibank, Comcast, AT&T, Time-Warner Cable, Olive Garden, T.G.I. Friday’s, Applebee’s, 
Macy’s, Target, Amazon, Uber, and Lyft all impose arbitration and class action bans in 
employment contracts). 
 6. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. 
 7. See, e.g., Military Lending Act, 10 U.S.C. § 987(e)(3) (2012) (prohibiting mandatory 
arbitration in certain forms of credit extended to military service members and dependents); 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e) (2012) 
(prohibiting mandatory arbitration in mortgage loan agreements); Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116, 123 Stat. 3409, 3454 (2010) (Franken 
Amendment) (prohibiting federal contractors in contracts in excess of $1 million from forcing 
employees to arbitrate Title VII or sexual assault claims); Fair Contracts for Growers Act of 
2007, S. 221, 110th Cong. § 17(b); Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act 
of 2001, S. 1140, 107th Cong. § 17(b). 
 8. See Zachary Warmbrodt, Pence Breaks Tie in Senate Vote to Ax Arbitration Rule, 
POLITICO (Oct. 24, 2017, 11:25 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/24/consumer-
protection-arbitration-senate-pence-244140 [https://perma.cc/X54H-AKFN].  Among 
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As we careen toward the cliff’s edge—“the virtual death of the class action 
in employment cases and consumer contracts involving the sale of goods and 
services”9—new coalitions of public interest lawyers and nonprofit entities 
have formed in search of state-based solutions to the dilemma of class action 
bans.  Their goal is to find creative solutions to the problem of 
underenforcement of consumer and worker rights that (1) are not baldly 
preempted by the U.S. Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of the 
Federal Arbitration Act and (2) are politically and financially viable in the 
current environment. 
This Article explores concerted state/private enforcement solutions to the 
problem of forced arbitration and class action bans.  These solutions vary in 
terms of the political risk that each entails, the legislative effort, if any, that 
would be required, and the potential each has for effecting structural change. 
The first model, as I proposed with coauthor Gary Friedman in the 
immediate wake of Concepcion, observes that state Attorneys General (AG) 
have authority to bring parens patriae suits on behalf of consumers and 
employees who are currently barred from collective litigation.10  And, to 
overcome inevitable resource constraints, AGs could retain private attorneys 
under contingent-fee arrangements to augment their existing staffs and 
budgets.  This approach requires no legislative changes and could go some 
ways toward replicating the pre-Concepcion litigation landscape by throwing 
in the beneficial filtering mechanism of the AG to weed out unmeritorious 
class action cases.  The downside of this model is that until these practices 
are commonplace, AGs are politically sensitive to the accusation that they 
are “in bed with the plaintiffs’ bar.” 
A second model, which I have also discussed in prior work, would simply 
have AGs bring their typical enforcement actions against rights violators.  In 
this model, however, rather than settle those cases without admissions of 
wrongdoing, the public enforcer would seek full-dress liability judgments, 
capable of delivering maximum preclusive effect on later individual 
arbitrations alleging the same wrongdoing.11  This do-it-yourself approach 
does not circumvent Concepcion so much as it embraces it:  public judgment 
in hand, individual consumers and employees (and their entrepreneurial 
lawyers) could bring serial arbitrations without bearing the cost of proving 
liability.  As with the first model, no enabling legislation is required.  
However, the daunting challenge here is how to incentivize the AG to go the 
extra mile and obtain a finding or admission of liability that could, in essence, 
turn the downstream arbitrations into nothing more than a series of damages 
inquests.  In other words, it is hard to see how to get state enforcers (or, for 
 
Republican Senators, only Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) and John Kennedy (R-La.) voted against 
repeal. Id. 
 9. Janet Cooper Alexander, To Skin a Cat:  Qui Tam Actions as a State Response to 
Concepcion, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1203, 1204 (2013). 
 10. See generally Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class:  Aggregate Litigation in 
the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012).   
 11. Myriam Gilles & Anthony Sebok, Crowd-Classing Individual Arbitrations in the 
Post-Class Action World, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 454–55 (2014). 
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that matter, their federal counterparts) to abandon their business-as-usual 
practice of concluding enforcement actions with consent decrees or 
settlements that allow the defendant to disclaim liability. 
Finally, this Article will consider “private attorney general” legislation 
authorizing consumers and workers to bring representative claims in the 
name of the state.  This model, which is the subject of proposed legislation 
in New York, Connecticut, Illinois, and Vermont, has vast potential.  It 
avoids the political risks to AGs embedded in the parens patriae model—but 
it shifts that risk to state legislators, as it requires legislative amendment to 
existing consumer or labor laws to provide for private enforcement of 
statutory penalty provisions.12 
I.  A “PROFOUND SHIFT IN OUR LEGAL HISTORY” 
In prior eras, class actions provided access to the court system by making 
it economically feasible for ordinary litigants to enforce legal rules in small-
value cases.  Aggregating claims rendered them marketable and aroused 
lawyers to invest time and money to litigate complex issues on behalf of a 
class of victims.  The net result was greater deterrence and compensation, as 
well as more extensive law enforcement. 
But recent decades have witnessed a gradual dismantling of access to 
courts through aggregative proceedings (and indeed, access to courts in 
nonaggregative settings as well).  Most insidiously, the Supreme Court in 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion13 upheld an arbitration clause containing 
a class action ban found in a standard-form consumer agreement.14  In doing 
so, the Court adopted a staggeringly expansive view of the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA), one that rejects a duty to preserve any “state-law rules 
that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”15  
In the years since Concepcion, a narrow majority of the Court has repeatedly 
deflected legal challenges to forced arbitration clauses and class action bans 
in varied contexts.16 
This jurisprudence heralds a “profound shift[] in our legal history”17 as 
hundreds of companies have scrambled to insert class action bans into 
 
 12. By way of full disclosure, I have worked with a group of nonprofit advocates and 
lawyers in drafting and promoting the EMPIRE Act and other state private attorney general 
legislation.  
 13. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).  
 14. Id. at 352. 
 15. Id. at 343; see also Gilles & Friedman, supra note 10, at 638–39 (discussing obstacle 
preemption analysis in Concepcion).  
 16. See generally Kindred Nursing Homes v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017) (preempting 
application of the state’s “clear statement” rule in nursing home admissions contracts); Am. 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (endorsing class action bans even 
where the costs of individually arbitrating claims would preclude victims from effectively 
vindicating their federal statutory rights). 
 17. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the 
Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/ 
business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html 
[https://perma.cc/R6J4-HV6C] (quoting Judge William G. Young). 
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standard-form contracts in order to avoid liability.18  In the wake of this 
campaign, motions to compel arbitration are now made and granted at a fast 
clip; lower federal courts—perceiving the Supreme Court’s hostility to 
policy-oriented arguments against arbitration and class action bans—have 
largely fallen into line to enforce these provisions.19  And this, in turn, has 
left millions of ordinary citizens without remedy for violations of statutory 
and common law rights resulting in small per-plaintiff harm.20 
While we should all care deeply about the spread of forced arbitration and 
class action bans, this Article takes as its starting point that state governments 
have the greatest cause for concern.  It is primarily state consumer and labor 
law that goes underenforced when private attorneys general are 
disempowered, and it is the states that will be left to respond to these rights 
violations in the absence of enforcement via class and collective litigation.21  
More meaningfully, states have a fundamental obligation to protect their 
weakest citizens from continual exploitation—and in this context, that duty 
is primarily owed to the low-income groups that bear the brunt of abusive 
practices that class actions were designed to deter.22  Forced arbitration and 
class action bans serve only to immunize bad actors who regularly prey on 
these disadvantaged groups and leave them without remedy and vulnerable 
to future exploitation.23  For these reasons, among others, states should be 
 
 18. See generally Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness:  Examining Consumer-
Friendly Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
825 (2012) (reporting on dozens of companies that have added arbitration clauses to consumer 
agreements in response to Supreme Court decisions). 
 19. See, e.g., Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding a 
Washington state contract law barring class waivers to be preempted by the FAA); Cruz v. 
Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1212–13 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[T]o the extent that 
Florida law would . . . invalidate the class waiver . . . [it] is preempted.”); see also Jean R. 
Sternlight, Tsunami:  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. 
L. REV. 703, 708 (2012) (“Most courts are rejecting all potential distinctions and are instead 
applying Concepcion broadly as a ‘get out of class actions free’ card.”). 
 20. See, e.g., DAVID SELIGMAN, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE MODEL STATE 
CONSUMER & EMPLOYEE JUSTICE ENFORCEMENT ACT 8 (2015), https://www.nclc.org/ 
images/pdf/arbitration/model-state-arb-act-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/RB5D-ASJ5] (noting 
that “class action waivers have effectively squelched hundreds of viable consumer and 
employment class actions—often in cases that are impossible or very difficult to bring on an 
individual basis”).   
 21. In addition to stepped-up public enforcement, abusive practices by dishonest 
businesses and shady employers may lead to downward spirals—lost jobs, child support 
delinquencies, unpaid medical bills, evictions, repeated bankruptcies—that ultimately land in 
the state’s lap, costing even more taxpayer dollars. 
 22. See Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare:  The Disappearance of Low-Income Litigants from 
the Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1540 (2016) (noting that “lower-income groups are 
more regularly and perilously exposed to abusive practices by private business interests—
abuses that often result in small-dollar consumer injuries or group-based workplace harms”); 
see also Susan E. Hauser, Predatory Lending, Passive Judicial Activism, and the Duty to 
Decide, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1508 (2008) (citing studies). 
 23. See Gilles, supra note 22, at 1552 (asserting that when low-income groups suffer 
group-based harm, there is a significant likelihood that the same or similarly situated 
individuals will suffer precisely the same harm in the future given the inability to escape 
poverty that results from current income inelasticity). 
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particularly sensitive to the impact of Concepcion and its progeny on their 
citizens. 
And while some states have sought to maximize access to justice in the 
post-class action era,24 legislative efforts to directly override Concepcion 
have been largely doomed by the Supremacy Clause.25  For example, state 
laws that simply prohibit class action bans in consumer or employment 
contracts or assert that collective litigation is a “substantive” right that cannot 
be waived in standard-form contracts would be swiftly and unequivocally 
struck down by the current Court.  Nor can state legislatures rest assured that 
any limits placed on contracts of adhesion will stand if doing so has any 
discernible effect on arbitration.  Indeed, any state legislation that might 
arguably “disfavor” arbitration is subject to serious challenge, given the 
Court’s “healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.”26  These 
difficulties are born out in the multitude of post-Concepcion cases upholding 
arbitration clauses in the face of state efforts to impose some control over 
private contracting that impinges on citizen access to courts.27 
As it stands, federal legislation or rulemaking appears politically hopeless, 
and straight-ahead state legislation circumventing Concepcion is doomed by 
the Supremacy Clause, as understood by the current Court.  Accordingly, 
tenacious consumer and labor advocates—and sympathetic legal scholars—
have shifted their gaze to alternative strategies for restoring citizens’ access 
to justice in the face of mandatory arbitration, namely concerted state/private 
enforcement models.  The following Part describes three such models and 
ruminates on the legal and political ramifications of each. 
II.  MODELING CONCERTED 
STATE/PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES 
In states all across the country, legal activists are avidly urging public 
enforcers to respond in one fashion or another to the Concepcion problem.  
While the proposals vary—including the three ideas discussed below and also 
the simple expedient solution of stepped-up state-level enforcement 
activity—all rely fundamentally on the threshold supposition that the 
 
 24. For example, in the wake of Concepcion, the California legislature briefly considered 
an outright legislative ban on class action waivers in adhesion contracts. See S. 491, 2012 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. 1 (Cal. 2012).  But the bill died in committee due to the likelihood of FAA 
preemption. See Cheryl Miller, Legislation to Blunt Concepcion Is Killed in State Assembly, 
RECORDER (July 3, 2012, 3:26 PM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/almID/12025618 
26154/ [https://perma.cc/7X6X-W22P]; see also Alexander, supra note 9, at 1221 (reporting 
on unsuccessful attempts in Maryland and California to legislatively prohibit class action bans 
in the immediate wake of Concepcion). 
 25. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 19, at 727 (“State 
legislatures have quite limited power to combat the effects of Concepcion given prior Supreme 
Court decisions.  In particular, state legislatures can neither prohibit mandatory arbitration nor 
prohibit use of arbitral class action waivers.”). 
 26. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343–45 (2011) (noting that any 
right that would disproportionately and negatively impact arbitration agreements by requiring 
procedures that “interfere[] with fundamental attributes of arbitration” is suspect under the 
FAA); Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630 n.5 (2009). 
 27. See Gilles & Sebok, supra note 11, at 461 n.58. 
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Supreme Court’s proarbitration jurisprudence does not block the right of a 
public enforcer to bring collective litigation for damages on behalf of citizen-
victims who have waived their right to seek relief in court or in collective 
proceedings.28  This is based on the view that the public enforcer, who is not 
a party to the underlying contract imposing arbitration and class action bans, 
is immune from their reach. 
Much depends on whether that threshold supposition is safe.  Historically, 
it has been.  In its 2002 decision in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,29 the Court 
held that the EEOC could seek victim-specific damages for an ADA 
violation, even though the victims themselves had all signed class-waiving 
arbitration agreements with the employer.30  The majority reasoned that the 
EEOC was not a party to the arbitration agreement and possessed 
independent statutory authority to bring suit.31  In dissent, Justice Thomas 
strongly disagreed “that the EEOC may do on behalf of an employee that 
which an employee has agreed not to do for himself.”32  But that position 
only garnered three votes.  Whether it might muster a majority today is 
unclear. 
What’s more, contemporary arbitration clauses can contain language in 
which the employee or consumer purports to waive the right to be represented 
in a parens patriae suit by a public enforcer.33  Such a clause might be 
unenforceable.  Can private parties really use contracts to restrict the 
 
 28. Note that AGs may bring these cases pursuant to quasi-sovereign, proprietary, and 
parens patriae authorities, as well as under state consumer protection and fair dealing statutes. 
See Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public:  Representative Suits by State 
Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 493 (2012). 
 29. 534 U.S. 279 (2002). 
 30. Id. at 289 (reasoning that the FAA does not mention enforcement by public agencies 
but instead ensures the enforceability of private agreements to arbitrate). 
 31. Id. at 294 (“It goes without saying that a contract cannot bind a nonparty.”); see also 
Gilles & Friedman, supra note 10, at 661 (observing that the state’s “quasi-sovereign” interest 
justifying parens patriae authority is not derived from an agency relationship with these 
individual citizens but rather from its own interest in representing large groups of injured 
citizens). 
 32. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 298 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia joined the dissent. 
 33. While I have not found specific examples of parens patriae waivers in arbitration 
clauses, there are a handful of class action settlements where the parties agreed to release 
parens patriae claims. See, e.g., In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust 
Litig., No. 05-MD-1720, 2014 WL 12654593, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2014) (releasing any 
future claims “whether individual, class, representative, parens patriae, or otherwise in nature, 
for damages, interest, costs, expenses, attorneys’ fees, fines, civil or other penalties, or other 
payment of money, or for injunctive, declaratory, or other equitable relief”); Master Settlement 
Agreement Between Forty-Six State Attorneys General and Five Tobacco Companies (1998), 
http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/master 
-settlement-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KNU-7F6Y] (releasing claims by “persons or 
entities acting in a parens patriae, sovereign, quasi-sovereign, private attorney general, qui 
tam, taxpayer, or any other capacity, whether or not any of them participate in this 
settlement”).  In the Payment Card litigation, the breadth of this release threatened to tank the 
deal—so the parties ultimately agreed that it only barred claims that state AGs might assert in 
a representative capacity on behalf of state resident members of the class and did not “extend 
to parens patriae claims that States assert in their sovereign capacity.” In re Payment Card 
Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 207, 237 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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government’s enforcement authority?  That is not clear either.  A very close 
analogy is found in cases addressing the enforceability of contract clauses 
that require employees to waive their rights to representative litigation under 
California’s Private Attorney General Act (PAGA).  PAGA authorizes 
aggrieved employees to act as agents of the Labor Commissioner in bringing 
representative suits for violations of the state’s Labor Code.34  California 
state and federal courts have repeatedly held contractual waivers of these 
rights to be unenforceable on public policy grounds—namely that such 
waivers would “harm the state’s interests in enforcing the Labor Code.”35 
If we assume that parens patriae waivers embedded in arbitration clauses 
are a bridge too far and that Waffle House can survive a frontal attack, then 
we can take some comfort that public enforcers are immune from the reach 
of class-banning arbitration clauses.  So for now at least, it seems fair to 
conclude that in the wake of Concepcion, state attorneys general and other 
officials remain free to bring cases on behalf of large groups of injured 
citizens—even if those individual citizens are themselves subject to 
arbitration clauses that preclude collective litigation. 
Presently, I discern three models for state/private concerted activity that 
would leverage the standing of these public officials in order to escape the 
harmful effects of Concepcion.  Each warrants discussion. 
A.  The Parens Patriae Model 
Following Concepcion, I argued that a legally sound and economically 
viable way to promote access to justice for people subject to class bans was 
for public enforcers to increase their use of parens patriae actions and to 
retain outside counsel on a contingent-fee basis to prosecute the cases day to 
day, subject to the public enforcer’s direction.36 
The model has some obvious upsides.  For one, it is legally viable.  Under 
the current law of most states, AGs are authorized to hire private law firms 
on a contingent-fee basis to pursue claims in parens patriae on behalf of 
injured state residents.37  The principal legal constraint is the requirement that 
 
 34. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698–2699.5 (West 2016); see also Arias v. Superior Court, 209 
P.3d 923, 933 (Cal. 2009) (“An employee plaintiff suing, as here, under the [PAGA] does so 
as the proxy or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement agencies. . . .  In a lawsuit brought 
under the act, the employee plaintiff represents the same legal right and interest as state labor 
law enforcement agencies—namely, recovery of civil penalties that otherwise would have 
been assessed and collected by the Labor Workforce Development Agency.”). 
 35. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 133, 149 (Cal. 2014) (noting that 
the “FAA’s goal of promoting arbitration as a means of private dispute resolution does not 
preclude our Legislature from deputizing employees to prosecute Labor Code violations on 
the state’s behalf”); see also Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 431 (9th 
Cir. 2015); O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 311 F.R.D. 547, 555–57 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 36. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 10, at 658.  
 37. For cases upholding contingency-fee agreements between AGs and private counsel, 
see City of Grass Valley v. Newmont Mining Corp., No. 2:04-cv-00149-GEB-DAD, 2007 WL 
4166238, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2007); Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Columbus, No. 
C2-06-829, 2007 WL 2079774, at *2–4 (S.D. Ohio July 18, 2007); City & County of San 
Francisco v. Philip Morris, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 1997).  But see Martin H. 
Redish, Private Contingent Fee Lawyers and Public Power:  Constitutional and Political 
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the AG maintain total control over all key decision-making, lest the retainer 
agreement violate public policy as an unlawful delegation of the AG’s 
authority.38  This model addresses those constraints by installing a 
responsible, elected official at the helm to manage and make transparent 
decisions regarding case selection, litigation strategy, and settlement.39 
Another virtue of the parens patriae state/private enforcement model is 
scalability:  relying on contingent-fee law firms permits a state AG to ramp 
up public enforcement levels without affecting her agency’s budget.40  The 
size of the cases and potential for attorneys’ fees certainly make them 
fundable.  Outside firms (and funders) can be expected to line up for the 
chance to contribute the out-of-pocket costs required for major public-
enforcer-led damages litigation.  And the talent pool available in the private 
bar is both extraordinary and easy to monitor since the outside counsel is not 
billing the public agency for its efforts or outlays.41  Moreover, settlements 
and verdicts obtained by state and local enforcement agencies produce both 
economic and political benefits.  They generate money for the agency’s own 
budget42 and distributable funds for the client-community distributions that 
may in turn generate political benefits for an enterprising AG.43 
But the political risks can be high.  Backlash from the staggering fees some 
states paid to outside contingent-fee counsel in lawsuits against cigarette 
manufacturers in the 1990s—nearly $14 billion in total44—led to a spate of 
 
Implications, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 77, 101–06 (2010) (asserting that AGs hiring private 
counsel on contingency violates constitutional norms). 
 38. See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21, 36 (Cal. 2010) 
(upholding a contract where the county hired outside counsel on contingency in public 
nuisance actions against lead-paint manufacturers because “neutral, conflict-free government 
attorneys retain[ed] the power to control and supervise the litigation”); State v. Lead Indus. 
Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 477 (R.I. 2008) (same).  
 39. See, e.g., Gilles & Friedman, supra note 10, at 671 (“In terms of case selection too, 
the responsible AG acts as a filter—a bulwark against unmeritorious cases on which private 
lawyers might otherwise ‘take a flier’ in order to exploit in terrorem effects.  And at the 
settlement stage, class counsels’ rational economic interests might drive them to eschew 
injunctive relief in favor of damages, but the final-cut authority belongs to the AG, 
ameliorating a principal basis for the agency costs critique of class actions.”). 
 40. See David B. Wilkins, Rethinking the Public-Private Distinction in Legal Ethics:  The 
Case of “Substitute” Attorneys General, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 423, 427 (observing that AGs 
face “shrinking state budgets and the growing list of potential big-ticket claims involving 
alleged harms to consumers or the environment”).  
 41. See, e.g., Gilles & Friedman, supra note 10, at 669.  
 42. The extent to which the state or agency retains litigation proceeds is generally 
determined by statute.  In California, for example, there is a formula built into the unfair 
competition statute. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17206(c) (2018) (“If the action is brought 
by the Attorney General, one-half of the penalty collected shall be paid to the treasurer of the 
county in which the judgment was entered, and one-half to the General Fund.”). 
 43. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 10, at 671–72 & nn.218–19 (describing polls indicating 
high voter approval for state AGs who can take credit for litigation victories that were largely 
the product of private lawyering).   
 44. John O’Brien, Bush Bans Contingency Fee Arrangements, LEGAL NEWSLINE (May 
17, 2007), http://legalnewsline.com/news/195296-bush-bans-contingency-fee-arrangements 
[https://perma.cc/JG8N-W7X3].  
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adverse publicity.  Fierce lobbying from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce45 
and others led a handful of state legislatures to place limits on the ability of 
AGs to hire outside counsel.46  And, presumably, the publicity and the 
lobbying have deterred some sizeable number of state enforcers from 
aligning with contingent-fee counsel.47 
There is legal risk as well.  It is not entirely clear whether parens patriae 
settlements and verdicts will bar subsequent damages suits by individual 
claimants who were not afforded an opportunity to opt out of the parens 
patriae litigation.  As Maggie Lemos points out, some state statutes explicitly 
provide a right to opt out of parens patriae actions,48 and some federal 
provisions do this as well.49  Moreover, parties and courts can always agree 
to employ opt-out procedures to ensure the broadest possible preclusion 
effects for any settlement.  But what about the non-opt-out parens patriae 
damages settlement, or verdict?  Courts often recite—in a blithe and blanket 
way—that parens patriae judgments are entitled to broad preclusive effect, 
thus barring future damages claims.50  And yet, following Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Dukes51 and related cases, it is hard to see how these settlements can 
foreclose subsequent damages claimants as a matter of due process.52 
Whatever its theoretical merits and prospective challenges, the parens 
patriae model for state/private concerted enforcement action has not taken 
off as a counter to Concepcion.  To be sure, some AGs regularly hire private 
counsel to handle large and complex litigation; examples include prominent 
 
 45. Barry Meier & Richard A. Oppel Jr., States’ Big Suits Against Industry Bring Battle 
on Contingency Fees, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/15/us/ 
states-big-suits-against-industry-bring-battle-on-contingency-fees.html 
[https://perma.cc/YC5G-R98K] (reporting on the Chamber’s “intensive lobbying campaign to 
get legislatures to drastically restrict states’ use of contingency lawyers”).  
 46. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-37,135 (West 2017) (subjecting any agreement 
between the AG and a private lawyer for over $1 million in fees to public legislative hearings 
and approval); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-12-08.1 (2017) (requiring an “emergency commission” 
to approve any contingency-fee contract between the AG and outside counsel where the 
amount in controversy exceeds $150,000). 
 47. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 10, at 673 (observing that in the post-Citizens 
United era, some elected officials may rightly worry about the “ability of business groups to 
amass war chests targeting consumer-friendly AGs”); see also Eric Lipton, Lobbyists, Bearing 
Gifts, Pursue Attorneys General, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 
10/29/us/lobbyists-bearing-gifts-pursue-attorneys-general.html [https://perma.cc/T2Y6-
KH9W].  See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 48. Lemos, supra note 28, at 545 n.265 (listing six state statutes but noting that “coverage 
is spotty”).  
 49. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012). 
 50. See Lemos, supra note 28, at 500 & n.55 (listing cases and reporting that “the 
prevailing view is that the judgment in a state case is binding ‘on every person whom the state 
represents as parens patriae’” (quoting Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons from the 
Laboratories:  Cy Pres Distributions in Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought by State 
Attorneys General, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 361, 362 (1999))).  
 51. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).  
 52. See id.  
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lawsuits against lead-paint manufacturers,53 polluters,54 and long-term care 
facilities.55  Likewise, some local officials—especially the city attorneys of 
San Francisco and Los Angeles—regularly bring damages claims on behalf 
of all statewide consumers under California’s Unfair Competition Law.56  
These city attorneys rely heavily on outside contingent-fee counsel to identify 
and help prosecute the cases, with damages distributed at the back end in the 
same fashion as a class settlement.  Still, for whatever reason(s), the model 
employed in these cases has yet to scratch the surface of its potential to 
counter the access-denying effects of Concepcion. 
B.  The Arbitration-Enabler Model 
A separate model for concerted state/private enforcement is where a public 
enforcer—such as a state AG or a local authority—obtains in court a liability 
determination that can serve as a predicate for the application of nonmutual 
offensive collateral estoppel in subsequent one-on-one arbitrations by 
consumers and employees.57  By absorbing the front-end costs of proving 
liability, the public enforcer enables individual citizens to bring arbitrations 
and allows entrepreneurial lawyers to “identify and contract with similarly 
situated claimants for serialized arbitrations.”58 
First, the virtues.  At the outset, no legislative inputs are required.  The 
claim and issue-preclusion rules in arbitration are, in practice, similar to those 
in court.59  Arbitrators presiding over damages arbitrations can be expected 
to apply issue-preclusion principles to judgments obtained by public 
enforcers.  And with a public verdict available, consumers and employees 
can (in many cases) overcome the stacked economics of Concepcion.60  Mass 
 
 53. See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21, 36 (Cal. 2010); State 
v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 477 (R.I. 2008). 
 54. See Adam Liptak, A Deal for the Public:  If You Win, You Lose, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/09/us/09bar.html [https://perma.cc/H28R-Z44B] 
(describing how an Oklahoma AG hired private counsel to sue poultry companies for polluting 
waterways with chicken manure); Lynne Tuohy, NH Appeals Order to Set Aside $195M of 
Exxon Award, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Oct. 3, 2013, 11:39 AM), 
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-nh-appeals-order-to-set-aside-195m-of-exxon-
award-2013oct03-story.html [https://perma.cc/9FAU-3UQN] (describing how a New 
Hampshire AG hired private counsel to sue chemical manufacturers for groundwater 
contamination). 
 55. See, e.g., GGNSC Clarion LP v. Kane, 131 A.3d 1062, 1064–65, 1067 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2016) (upholding the right of the Pennsylvania AG to hire private counsel to pursue 
statutory consumer protection actions against long-term care facilities).   
 56. Hillel Aron, L.A. City Attorney Will Hire Outside Counsel to Defend NIMBY Lawsuits, 
LA WKLY. (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.laweekly.com/news/la-city-attorney-will-hire-
outside-counsel-to-defend-nimby-lawsuits-5301349 [https://perma.cc/PGV2-4CZS].  
 57. See Gilles & Sebok, supra note 11, at 470.  
 58. Id. at 455 (observing that the transaction costs of identifying potential clients “are 
significantly reduced when discovery under [this] model produces the identities of affected 
consumers, enabling lawyers to contact potential clients to determine their willingness to sell, 
assign, or otherwise have their claims arbitrated”). 
 59. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules:  Privatizing Law 
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 746 (1999). 
 60. See J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in 
Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1210 (2012) (“[I]t is inconceivable that a private 
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production of individual damages claims is generally feasible for enterprising 
law firms—that is, unless damages are both small and idiosyncratic, 
entrepreneurial lawyers will be able to bring large economies of scale to bear 
by efficiently processing individual damages claims in arbitration. 
One downside of this model is that it requires changes from both 
arbitration providers and public enforcers.  First, under this model, major 
arbitral bodies (such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and 
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service (JAMS)) would need to adopt 
reliable rules regarding the res judicata effect of public liability judgments, 
as well as manageable procedures for administering postjudgment serial 
arbitrations.  The former is fairly straightforward; the latter entails designing 
a mass-arbitration regime that provides litigants and lawyers dependable 
information on “how to obtain a single arbitrator for a set of related 
arbitrations, how to schedule related arbitrations in a compressed time frame, 
or how to use a single expert report across multiple arbitrations.”61  In late 
2015, this author met with AAA administrators to discuss the viability of 
serial arbitrations under this model and suggested that existing rules leave too 
much discretion to individual arbitrators to determine some of these bedrock 
issues—a lack of transparency and trustworthiness that doomed any serious 
effort to efficiently bundle arbitrations.  The AAA appeared, at that time, 
unwilling to make broad rule changes—but acknowledged that successive 
waves of individual arbitrations might force them to reconsider. 
The arbitration-enabler model also requires public enforcers to radically 
adjust their everyday objectives.  Public civil enforcement attorneys 
invariably enter into settlements that allow the defendant to disclaim any 
wrongdoing.62  In other words, AGs often negotiate “settlement[s] in which 
liability attaches” but with “no factual admission of wrongdoing”63—
presumably because they regard the penalties shelled out or injunctive relief 
agreed to by the wrongdoer as the real engines of deterrence.  The arbitration-
enabler model would require government lawyers to spurn these “nolo-type” 
settlements and to expend additional resources to obtain a liability verdict or 
concession of wrongdoing.  This may be quite a bit to ask, especially if it 
makes settlements impossible to obtain.64 
 
attorney, who might have sufficient expertise in consumer fraud, will have the economic 
incentive to root out consumer fraud if the only economic gain to be had is through individual 
arbitrations.  The significant investment of resources required to identify wronged individuals 
and to pursue their small claims on an individualized basis likely will not justify any eventual 
gains.”). 
 61. Gilles & Sebok, supra note 11, at 467 (observing that neither the AAA nor JAMS 
currently have any such procedures in place).   
 62. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of Wrongdoing in Public 
Enforcement of Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 505, 509 (2013) (observing that the “standard 
settlement of an SEC enforcement action brought in federal district court is in the form of a 
consent decree in which the defendant ‘neither admits nor denies’ liability”).   
 63. Id.  
 64. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private 
Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 669 (2013) (“If cooperatively negotiated 
informal bargains with regulators, aimed at enhancing compliance, will not protect 
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But requiring public enforcers to secure declarations of wrongdoing may 
become a new standard in any event, as numerous observers and judges have 
disparaged settlements that fail to do so (quite apart from the arbitration-
enabler model).  Consider the public maelstrom when Judge Jed Rakoff 
rejected a 2011 settlement between the SEC and Citigroup that failed to 
demand that the bank acknowledge its wrongful actions.65  In his ruling, 
Judge Rakoff criticized the SEC’s custom of entering “neither admit nor deny 
the allegations” settlements, especially given its “duty, inherent in its 
statutory mission, to see that the truth emerges.”66  These public setbacks 
may eventually compel public enforcers to adjust their approach to settling 
actions, with the beneficial by-product of enabling downstream individual 
arbitrations. 
C.  The Qui Tam Model 
A third model for state/private concerted enforcement activity is derived 
from qui tam procedures, akin to those found in the federal False Claims 
Act.67  In a qui tam regime, a whistleblower—known as a “relator”—files an 
action in the name of the state and provides detailed notice to the relevant 
enforcer (the DOJ in False Claims Act cases, and the state AG under the 
proposals discussed here).  The public enforcer then has several options.  It 
may intervene and take the case over, in which case the relator stands to 
receive a modest fee if the case is resolved successfully.  Or, the public 
enforcer may take a pass on getting involved, thus allowing the relator to 
prosecute the litigation on behalf of the state (in which case the relator stands 
to receive a percentage of any recovery).68  Or the AG may, if she wishes, 
intervene in order to dismiss the case—exercising, in essence, a veto power 
over the litigation.69 
The traditional rationale for qui tam is that it harnesses self-funded private 
lawyers to augment resource-constrained public enforcement agencies.  In a 
post-Concepcion world, the ability to tap private enforcement resources is 
particularly valuable.  As the class action mechanism is diminished, public 
enforcement portfolios swell.  And there is no indication that any jurisdiction 
 
organizations from private suits on the same issues, then the prospect of facing private suits 
will make voluntary agreements far harder to achieve.”). 
 65. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).   
 66. Id. at 335. 
 67. Professor Janet Alexander first proposed this model as a “way out of the Concepcion 
dilemma.” Alexander, supra note 9, at 1221 (suggesting that, by enacting “a statutory penalty 
for consumer fraud or violation of state labor laws and provid[ing] for private enforcement 
through a qui tam or private attorney general action,” states could ensure that their citizens 
were protected from systematic wrongdoing). 
 68. The FCA provides that successful relators receive between 15 and 25 percent of the 
recovery—enough of an incentive that, in 2016 alone, the Department of Justice recovered 
$2.9 billion from qui tam-initiated FCA suits. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice 
Department Recovers over $4.7 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016 
(Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-47-billion-
false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2016 [https://perma.cc/4C77-P8YS]. 
 69. See generally David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement’s Pathways:  Lessons 
from Qui Tam Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1913 (2014). 
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has responded to post-Concepcion developments by increasing funding to 
public enforcement agencies. 
Taken together, the public nature of the qui tam action and the penalty 
structure should allow enabling legislation to elude FAA preemption under 
Concepcion and its progeny.  First, the public nature of qui tam actions is 
critical to avoiding preemption because, as discussed earlier, “private 
individuals cannot contract away the state’s right to enforce the law.”70  
Directly on point, the Ninth Circuit recently held in Sakkab v. Luxottica 
Retail North America, Inc.71 that qui tam actions fall under the “historic 
police powers” delegated to the states by the Constitution and therefore 
cannot be preempted by federal law.72  Second, as applied here, the qui tam 
model would allow relators to file suit seeking statutory per-incident 
penalties on behalf of in-state consumers or employees.  As such, the 
penalties are intended to punish and deter wrongdoers who violate the 
statutory rights—not to compensate victims for their injuries.73  And, because 
the model applies only to cases seeking the prescribed penalty, it leaves 
individual claimants free to pursue damages for their losses without 
implicating double-recovery concerns.  In other words, the qui tam 
enforcement model does not seek “damages,” but a specific penalty that 
complements the individual damages action or arbitration.74  Viewed in this 
way, the qui tam model also sidesteps a potential pitfall of the parens patriae 
model—avoiding messy questions about opt-out procedures and preclusive 
effects.75 
At the same time, the qui tam model does not put funds into the pockets of 
injured victims.  The penalties flow to the state and, to a lesser extent, the 
relator.  Accordingly, the qui tam model may do a good job of promoting 
deterrence but an awful job of compensating injured parties.  One way to 
ameliorate this shortcoming is to join qui tam legislation and the arbitration-
enabler model.  For example, enabling legislation might prohibit relators and 
AGs from receiving benefits under a settlement in which the defendant does 
not acknowledge liability.  Access-to-justice advocates should cheer such a 
provision because, as discussed above in the arbitration-enabler model, a 
 
 70. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 1228 (observing that, because “[t]he private plaintiff 
stands in the state’s shoes to litigate the action” for civil penalties, qui tam claims are not 
subject to FAA preemption).  
 71. 803 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 2015).   
 72. Id. at 439.   
 73. Id. at 430–31 (observing that “the penalties contemplated under the PAGA . . . punish 
and deter employer practices that violate the rights of numerous employees” (quoting Brown 
v. Ralph’s Grocery Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 862 (Ct. App. 2011))). 
 74. Arguably, there is friction between qui tam actions and individual cases where 
punitive damages in the individual case, when added to the qui tam penalty, implicate 
overpunishment concerns. See generally BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) 
(finding that a $2 million punitive damage award was disproportionate to both the conduct 
alleged and the compensatory damages awarded). 
 75. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 1226 (“A private plaintiff can pursue an individual 
claim for compensatory damages in addition to a PAGA claim, and a judgment in a PAGA 
action does not preclude absent employees from bringing their own claims for compensatory 
damages.”).  
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finding or concession of liability will enable entrepreneurial lawyers to 
deploy broad-scale nominally individual arbitrations on behalf of victims 
seeking compensation.  Business groups should take comfort that this 
provision—no settlements without admissions of liability—will protect 
against aggressive relators and AGs using qui tam cases to shake down 
corporate defendants.76 
But the biggest disadvantage of the qui tam model may be that it requires 
enabling legislation.  Enacting such legislation can be a perilous, uncertain, 
lengthy, and frustrating process.  Over the past two years, consumer and labor 
advocates have offered up draft qui tam legislation in at least five states—a 
minimovement designed to encourage legislatures to embrace qui tam as a 
viable mechanism.  For example, in its 2017 legislative session, the 
Connecticut House of Representatives considered a bill to allow consumers 
harmed by fraud or unfair business practices to “bring an action in the name 
of the state” for injunctive relief and to recover statutory penalties.77  If 
successful, Connecticut relators could have recovered between 10 and 25 
percent of the penalties recouped on behalf of the state.78  While the bill had 
significant support and made it out of the Joint Committee on Banking, it 
ultimately failed to win enough votes in the general body.79 
Similarly, the Illinois Senate is considering creating a qui tam mechanism 
for public enforcement of both employment and consumer protection 
statutes.80  That legislation would allow private individuals to bring actions 
on behalf of the state seeking recovery of civil penalties for multiple 
consumer or employment violations so long as “those violations are of a 
sufficiently similar kind that they can be efficiently managed in a single 
action.”81  As of the publication of this Article, the Illinois bill had not made 
it into committee.  Vermont’s private attorney general bill was also recently 
introduced in committee,82 with hearings held on the capacity of this 
legislation to counteract the negative impact of forced arbitration.83  New 
York’s twin bills—the EMPIRE Worker Act and the EMPIRE Consumer 
Act—are also currently under consideration in Albany; both promise to 
expand the state’s enforcement capacity by enlisting citizens to investigate 
 
 76. See, e.g., Burbank et al., supra note 64, at 669 (noting that corporate defendants 
generally believe that “private litigants will be more likely to file non-meritorious suits that 
are brought for strategic or extortionate purposes against innocent defendants in the hope that 
they will find it cheaper to settle than to litigate”).  
 77. Act Protecting Victims of Fraud by Certain Financial Institutions, H.R. 7162, 2017 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2017). 
 78. Id. § 1(g). 
 79. Bill Status:  H.R. No. 7162, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Mar. 22, 2017), 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/asp/cgabillstatus/cgabillstatus.asp?selBillType=Bill&bill_num=HB0
7162&which_year=2017 [https://perma.cc/D63E-3G2H]. 
 80. Limitations on Forced Arbitration Act, S. 0983, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 
2017). 
 81. Id. § 10e(c). 
 82. Act Relating to Delegating Public Enforcement Powers to Private Attorneys General, 
H.R. 789, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018). 
 83. Elizabeth Hewitt, Lawmakers Consider Cracking Down on Forced Arbitration, VT. 
DIGGER (Jan. 9, 2018), https://vtdigger.org/2018/01/09/lawmakers-consider-cracking-forced-
arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/CZ2A-4FZ7]. 
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potential violations and enforce important laws.84  But again, despite intense 
lobbying efforts, the EMPIRE acts have not yet received legislative hearings, 
much less approval. 
CONCLUSION 
In the wake of Concepcion, states are increasingly motivated to find legally 
sound and economically viable means of promoting access to justice for 
citizens subject to forced arbitration and class action bans.  Especially 
promising are concerted state/private enforcement solutions, which can take 
several forms—including state AGs engaging private counsel to pursue 
parens patriae damages cases; a regime where government enforcers obtain 
liability verdicts that private parties can use as conclusive proof in individual 
arbitrations; or a qui tam model.  These solutions vary in terms of the political 
risk that each entails, the legislative effort that would be required (if any), 
and the potential each has for effecting structural change. 
 
 
 84. Empowering People in Rights Enforcement (EMPIRE) Worker Protection Act, 
Assemb. 7958, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017); Empowering People in Rights 
Enforcement (“EMPIRE”) Consumer Act, S. 6553, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017) 
(considering the EMPIRE Worker Act, which authorizes an aggrieved employee or 
representative organization to initiate a public enforcement action on behalf of the Labor 
Commissioner for violations of any provision of the New York labor law, while the Consumer 
Act allows aggrieved consumers to initiate similar public actions on behalf of the Attorney 
General to enforce specified consumer-protection statutes).   
